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The Grand Strategy of Nonstate Actors: Theory and
Implications
Abstract
This article addresses the Realist assumption that only actors that are states can be
considered to have a strategic culture. The primary issue raised is the question of the
ability of non-state actors to have a strategic culture. Al-Qaida is used as a theoretical case
study. Ultimately this article rejects the idea of territoriality in strategic culture formulation
and calls for academics and policymakers alike to adopt a broader conception of actors on
the international, stage. This broader conception of actors would necessitate rich case
studies to be done in the future in order to seek an understanding of the strategic culture
of the non-state actors which academics and policymakers must deal with in the modern
security environment. In particular, the article finds that the assumptions held about alQaida thus far are wrong and, in reality, the group has ambitions that are cosmic in nature,
which will necessitate change in the strategies used to fight against terrorism.
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Introduction
It is clear that one of the main problems facing the United States and her
allies in the twenty-first century is the problem of combating non-state actors,
in particular al-Qaida. In seeking to address the problem of the war against
terrorism from a social-scientific standpoint, this work asks and addresses
three key questions. The first asks whether or not a non-state actor can have
a strategic culture. Second, this work addresses the question of the possibility
of grand strategy among non-state actors. Following the discussion on those
two theoretical questions, a more policy-oriented question is considered:
What implications do the strategic culture and grand strategy of non-state
actors, al-Qaida in particular, have for the United States’ continuation of the
war against terrorism? Ultimately, this article finds that it is reasonable to
conclude that al-Qaida does, in fact, have a strategic culture, assuming one
rejects the mainstream Realist argument that only actors with territory ought
to be considered for analysis in terms of strategic culture. Rather, any group
which has a shared identity, historical narrative, shared culture, and longterm goals can be considered to have a strategic culture.

Epistemological Framework
The first question posed in the introductory section of this work concerns
whether or not a non-state actor can have a strategic culture. It is worth
noting that there is an explicit purpose to discussing strategic culture before
covering grand strategy. In order to answer the question of strategic culture
in non-state actors, it is necessary to define strategic culture. For the
purposes of this work, a parsimonious definition is adopted; this is for two
reasons. First, the attempt herein is to parse out the key, structural elements
to strategic culture. That is to say, the goal is to determine the logical skeleton
which supports other ideas of strategic culture. Second, the literature
suggests the necessary conclusion that the idea of strategic culture is highly
prone to concept stretching to the point of losing analytical leverage on the
subject matter. If the question, “what matters in the formation of strategic
thought?” is met with the answer “everything matters,” there is clearly some
flaw in the analytical logic. Therefore, the brief exploration of the literature
herein aims to arrive at a definition of strategic culture that is both short and
useful.

Strategic Culture Defined
Snyder offers the basic framework for strategic culture, the idea that, for
various cultural and historical reasons, different actors think about strategy in
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different ways. Upon this framework, other compelling ideas that may have
explanatory power ought to be placed to add analytical leverage. Ken Booth’s
work, Strategy and Ethnocentrism begins this process.1 He offers a tripartite
definition of ethnocentrism, which encompasses ideas of racial superiority,
poorly done social science, and ethnocentrism “as a synonym for being
culture bound.”2 Of additional definitional relevance is cultural relativism,
the idea that each of us sees the world (and formulates strategy) through a
cultural, socialized lens.3
In his seminal report on Soviet strategic culture, Snyder offers the following,
which allows the careful reader to construct a very basic definition of strategic
culture:
“Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic
thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general
beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear
strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on
the level of “culture” rather than mere “policy.”…[N]ew problems are
not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual
lens provided by the strategic culture.”4
Snyder, speaking to the context of the Cold War, roughly conceptualizes
strategic culture as a socialized set of values, priorities, and ideas the shape
the logical calculus of actors over long periods of time. While Snyder thinks
in terms of the Soviet nuclear strategy, these ideas presuppose neither stateness nor territoriality of actors as necessary, a-priori concepts.
Booth further offers fifteen propositions which will not be specifically
enumerated here; however, this summary of his theoretical posits may prove
useful:




Strategists view the world in an ethnocentric manner, which has
sometimes led to tactical and strategic mistakes.
Strategists have been incurious about their own and others’
thinking, which ought to change.
The rational man is a tool which has outlived its utility.

Booth, Ken, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979).
Ibid, 15.
3 Ibid, 16-17.
4 Snyder, Jack, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear
Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977).
1

2
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Cultural relativism is a useful tool for understanding the strategic
world more accurately and, ultimately, a step toward building good
strategy.5

Essentially, Booth can be understood as taking the ideas first formed by
Snyder and adding the ethnocentric element to the historical analysis of
culture. This is framed within a critique of American strategic thinking
which, Booth argues, we assume is the only rational way of thinking out there.
Instead, Booth argues, we ought to think in terms of cultural relativism. That
is to say, we need to learn why Americans think and act like Americans, why
Russians act like Russians, and, for the purposes of this paper, why members
of al-Qaida act as such.
The following serves as a working definition of Strategic culture: Strategic
Culture is the socialized sets of norms, values, and priorities, which change
with time and are informed by a shared, group identity, which informs the
logic of an actor’s strategic thought.

The State-ness Issue in Grand Strategic Thought
In the thinking of Snyder, Booth, and others on the issue of strategic thought,
the discussion seems to be nearly unanimously framed in terms of states.
Snyder, for instance, wrote his piece in 1977. At that time the Soviet Union, a
state actor, was the primary threat as perceived in the United States. This is
not the case in 2015. What is more important than simply considering states
to be the primary actors is consideration of what about states makes them
actors in creating and implementing strategic culture. There are four
requirements in the formation of a strategic culture at the group level:





Self-determined sense of identity as a group.
A defined historical narrative.
A leadership structure.
A culturally relative and logical means-ends thought
process.

These four characteristics will be met by states with little critique from those
more traditional Realist thinkers. But this work departs from the tradition of
Waltz, Snyder, Booth and others by rejecting the idea of territoriality being
necessary for an actor to be considered an important participant in the
international system.
5

Ibid, 17-20.
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To illustrate this reasoning on the lack of territoriality in the non-territorial
definition of strategic culture, the historical case of Israel is useful. It is clear
to even the most casual student of the history of the Middle East that the
nation of Israel existed long before the modern nation-state of Israel. A group
of people came together with a shared, Jewish identity under the historical
narrative of Jewish homeland in Israel, under one leadership structure
wherein the logical choice made was to declare the state of Israel and defend
it.6 The Israeli case makes it clear that a nation (defined as a group of people
sharing the first three characteristics identified, basically the idea of an us)
can have a shared strategic culture.
In keeping with the idea of the Israeli case, a side note on recognition is
important. Several nation states do not recognize Israel; that does not make
it less of a state. The important thing is that the Israelis recognize Israel. It
does not matter, following the same logic, whether or not we in the West
recognize al-Qaida as a legitimate political actor or state: this group considers
itself a political actor in shared identity, history, and ideas, therefore it ought
to be considered an actor according to the four-part definition of a group that
has a strategic culture as proposed in this work.

Al- Qaida and Strategic Culture Formation
In determining whether or not al-Qaida has a strategic culture, the logical
place to start is the relevant chapter in the masterfully edited volume,
Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction. The work addresses the
key question of this section rather directly, albeit in terms of the group’s
supposed desire to acquire a nuclear weapon. Overall, the authors agrees that
al-Qaida does have a strategic culture and provides reinforcing evidence to
the four theorized criteria provided.7 Specifically, Johnson et al. point out
that Bin Laden acted as a “mujtahid”8 who fashioned a coherent doctrine,
citing events of the twentieth century and ideas of Sunni nationalism which
made a war against those who oppose the constructed ideology of the group
(the governments of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in particular),
a necessary and logical step for those buying into the radical Sunni ideology.9
Additionally, the author cites myriad internal documents which indicate that
6Rogan,

Eugene, The Arabs, A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
Johnson, Jeanie, Kerry Kartchner, and Jeffery Larsen (eds.) Strategic Culture and
Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
8 One who interprets Islamic history: not a prophet, but a leader, especially in the Sunni
tradition.
9 Johnson et al., Strategic Culture, 202-210.
7
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al-Qaida is fighting a planned, politically-motivated war in which violence is
condoned, but does have clear rules, although they are rules we in the West do
not follow.10
This idea of a Sunni nationality, promulgated by Bin Laden and others, speaks
to the first requirement in creating a strategic culture: a shared identity. An
individual may consider himself part of a Sunni nation that transcends
borders rather than an Iraqi, for instance. The clear historical narrative Long
outlines presents in some detail that, indeed, al-Qaida has a clearly selfdetermined place in history. Founded in Qutb’s notions of Jihad read
through the lens of Wahhabism, a particular view of Islam, with its
prescriptive notions of violence, al-Qaida’s shared identity transcends the
nation states of the region and is cosmic in nature.11 Ideologically, the group
is reactionary against secular Arab Nationalism, the colonial borders of SykesPicot, and revolutionary in the expansionist Wahabi sense of the word, a
sense which is both deeply sectarian in its thinking and expansionist in its
ideology.12
The leadership structure of al-Qaida has well-defined goals: driving the West
out of the region and causing damage to those they find in violation of their
reading of Islamic principles.13 It is with this in mind that it can be ultimately
concluded that al-Qaida has a strategic culture. Through a careful study of
the group, one comes to the conclusion that, within their own socialized
framework and strategic logic, members of al-Qaida are behaving rationally.

Conclusions and Implications for Western Strategy in the
Global War on Terror: Understanding the Grand Strategy of AlQaida
Thus far, this work has argued that al-Qaida has a strategic culture and a
grand strategy. Essentially, this article attempts to convince the reader that
territoriality is not a deciding factor in determining whether a particular actor
is appropriate for strategic analysis. Rather, an actor must have a shared
history and identity along with a narrative that suggests action. In that
regard, the main contribution herein, on theoretical terms, is the idea that
non-state actors can be considered in terms of their strategic culture. What
Ibid, 210-212.
Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God; The Global Rise of Religious
Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).
12 Allen, Charles, God's Terrorists: the Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern
Jihad, (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006).
13 Jeurgensmeyer, 208-209.
10
11
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remains to be done is an analysis of what al-Qaida’s strategic culture means in
terms of the United States’ global war on terror.
It is necessary, in light of the events of this century thus far, for some strategic
thinkers to reexamine thinking on groups such as al-Qaida. For instance, in
Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Paul, Wirtz, and
Fortmann argue that the emergence of non-state actors which engage in
guerilla warfare against traditional actors originated from some sort of
mechanical effect of “imperial overstretch.”14 This assumption overlooks the
fact that such groups can have strategies of their own and instead delegates
the actions of these groups to a secondary role. This is at our peril in the
West. The failure to understand the actors against which we are fighting is
dangerous as it leads to overly simple notions of non-state actors. These
actors, as it has been demonstrated throughout history, have the power to
threaten the security of nations. Sadly, it also appears to be one of the
foundational assumptions of current U.S. strategy. Policymakers, scholars,
and informed citizens ought to reconsider their conceptions of these actors.
Rather than seeing al-Qaida as an incoherent actor, we ought to consider
these actors as having a strategic logic that we can follow and understand in
order to make more effective policy in the region.

American Hegemony in a Stateless War
As a global hegemon, it is trivial to argue that the United States can, in terms
of military might, defeat a country militarily. We can bomb cities, depose
leaders, and reduce military and civilian infrastructure to ash and twisted
rubble. This has been proven time and time again; the Second World War
and the First Gulf War serve as fantastic examples of the sheer military might
commanded by the United States. Clearly, though, as evidenced by the
statements from the executive branch during the time of the formulation of
current U.S. grand strategy, beating Iraq militarily was but one, secondary
goal, celebrated in the now infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech in
2003.
The main theme of the War on Terror, however, is a fight not against Iraq or
Afghanistan, but against terrorism. The “ism” in the last sentence is bold for
an important reason. The ‘ism’ in terrorism denotes that it is an idea. That is
to say, that the United States is attempting to fight an idea. Fighting the idea
of terror is different than combatting the tactics of terror: the latter, as
Paul, T.V., James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and
Practice in the 21st Century (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
14

74
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1452

Pierman: The Grand Strategy of Nonstate Actors

evidenced by the relative few attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11, can be done.
Neither any relevant literature nor the faculties of reason provide any way to
bomb, invade, occupy, or otherwise militarily defeat an idea. And yet, this is
exactly what the United States claims to be doing in the Middle East. This is
absurd. Instead, policymakers should to take the advice of Brands and
“Emphasize the ‘how’ as well as the ‘what’ in making grand strategy.”15 If we
ask the question of how to fight against an idea and are met with a total lack
of knowledge on where to begin, perhaps fighting against an ‘ism’ ought not to
be part of our grand strategy. It is highly unlikely and even absurd that any
number of invasions of Middle Eastern nations will constitute a ‘win’ in the
war against terrorism.
In taking more advice from the pragmatic thinker, Brands, a second group of
critiques can be made:
“If American grand strategy is to be effective, U.S. officials will have to
go back to first principles and confront some of the most difficult
questions about the country’s global role. What is the nature of the
international system in the twenty-first century, and in what direction
is that system evolving?”16
These questions have not been asked in the context of strategic planning in
the United States, and there have been and will continue to be consequences
for this unquestioning behavior. There may well be good reasons for this. In
the old international system, that of the Cold War, the United States could act
in comfortable, predictable ways. The United States could play geopolitical
chess knowing that the other actors, other states, were playing the same
game. It was in this world that the bargaining advice of Schelling and game
theory could be applied with some success, even in light of limited
information.17
The international system has changed. Rather than simply being the
anarchical system of nation-states outlined by Waltz, the world today has
actors such as al-Qaida that cannot be bargained with in the same way
because their goals transcend territory. Take, for instance, the hallmark of
U.S.-Soviet relations for much of the Cold War: The United States held

Brands, Hal, What Good is Grand Strategy? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2004).
16 Ibid.
17 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1960).
15
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Moscow hostage and the Soviets could say the same of Washington D.C.
While the situation was far from ideal from a human security standpoint,
mutual deterrence did, it seems, lead to mutual restraint. This is due to the
territorial nature of the actors involved. The same cannot be said of a group
that conceives of itself as an ummah, a community transcending national
boundaries. As recent history has shown, al-Qaida can hit New York, but
destroying Iraq and Afghanistan has not resulted in the demise of the terrorist
group. The game has changed. We now live in a world in which we are faced
with actors that do not have capitals we can bomb or occupy.
Rather than fighting a war of territory, the strategic culture and grand
strategy of al-Qaida are, to borrow a term from Aslan, cosmic.18 Even if the
United States were to agree to the explicit terms outlined by Bin Laden as
goals for al-Qaida, that is to say, total U.S. and Western withdrawal from the
Middle East, it is doubtful that this would end the current conflict. This is due
to the fact that the war in which al-Qaida is engaged is only partly of this
earth. The other half is, as discussed in the section on the development of the
al-Qaida strategic culture, a battle of ideas based in an interpretation of a
shared Sunni identity which mandates the destruction of nonbelievers.

Policy Recommendations
Conventional, Realist thinking in the war against terrorism has been the
primary object of theoretical critique in this work. In light of this critique,
several policy recommendations can be made.
First and foremost, the United States ought to define clear, achievable
strategic goals. This advice is not novel. In fact, it is advocated by authors
ranging from Clausewitz to Schelling and Brands. In this particular case,
however, what is being called for is an end to the way we have been thinking
of a war on terrorism, on the grounds that fighting an idea with military
means is an exercise in tilting at windmills. Rather, the United States, if it
sincerely wishes to achieve the goals of a more peaceful world, ought to focus
less on drone strikes and more on the development of infrastructure and
institutions in the Middle East. The United States also ought to bring the
actors involved to the table in the UN headquarters as opposed to fighting in
the deserts of Iraq and Syria, which is clearly a futile venture.

Aslan, Reza, How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the end of the War
on Terror (New York: Random House, 2009).
18

76
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1452

Pierman: The Grand Strategy of Nonstate Actors

Second, those in policy circles must carefully consider the literature on
strategic culture, especially Booth’s ideas on cultural relativism. It is in light
of these ideas that the interested reader comes to understand that while the
United States is playing geopolitical chess, al-Qaida is playing cricket; that is
to say, an entirely different game. In this era wherein non-state actors are
undoubtedly players in the international realm, we must, as strategists,
recognize that actors behave differently.
In this work, brief definitions of both strategic culture and grand strategy
have been posited using minimalist definitions of both concepts to avoid
concept stretching and to allow for a broadening of theory. It is this
theoretical broadening that represents the major contribution of this work.
Overall, it is clear that non-state actors can have both a strategic culture and a
grand strategy. In exploring the case of al-Qaida, much can be learned. It is a
group with a shared identity, a sense of a historical narrative, a leadership
structure, and some sense of logic. This indicates that the group has a
strategic culture. Furthermore, the group has clear goals and reasonable
means by which to reach them. This represents the grand strategy of the
terrorist organization.
The major issue for U.S. grand strategy in dealing with al-Qaida is that the
United States presupposes territoriality of actors, as many realist thinkers do.
This narrative paints groups such as al-Qaida as mechanistic creations of a
hegemon that has expanded too far. This is an explanation which ignores the
agency of such groups and does not solve problems. The lack of tangible
results in the nearly fifteen-year war against terrorism speaks to the clear
flaws of current strategic thought on non-state actors as non-actors or nonimportant actors. A broader view may be more accurate.
Looking forward, policymakers and academics alike should be open to
considering that the rules of the game are changing. Rather than nation-state
to nation-state relations, in the face of a more globalized world in which
physical borders appear to matter less, especially in the less-developed
regions of the world, we as thinkers would be remiss if we did not consider the
possibility that actors without territories could have strategic cultures and
grand strategies.
Al-Qaida is not an incoherent actor that cannot be understood in its barbarity.
Rather, with the careful consideration of the literatures on strategic culture
and grand strategy, we can begin to unravel the mystery of al-Qaida and
groups like it, such as the growing threat of ISIS. This is all done with the
77
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implicit normative goal of attempting to bring these conflicts to as amicable
an end as possible, seeking to make the world a better place though
understanding of the actors which are part of the international system.
Realists have done excellent work in understanding the behavior of states; it
is high time for the scholastic community to also consider other actors that
present problems to states and the people who occupy them. Further work
would include a careful examination at the contingent place in history
occupied by al-Qaida, in particular the links between the group and the Saudi
state; such a history will undoubtedly cast light on some questions herein
raised but is ultimately beyond the scope of this work which is largely
theoretical rather than historical in nature.

78
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1452

